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ABSTRACT How do firms decide which R&D projects to pursue and which ones to cast aside? 
We use a real options approach to advance our understanding of how firms manage uncertain-
ties in R&D project management, in particular uncertainties linked to the external scientific 
environment. Our findings highlight how these uncertainties have an impact on the initiation 
and discontinuation of R&D projects. We examine these effects in the context of shifts in US 
science policy in the cell therapy field, using a dataset on 570 R&D projects in the global cell 
therapy sector, initiated over the period 1986–2011. We find decreased R&D project initiation 
rates and higher discontinuation rates for projects initiated by US firms in the aftermath of 
policy shifts that increased uncertainties about public funding support for US cell therapy 
research. We also highlight how this effect was reversed as the US public funding outlook for 
such research recovered.
Keywords: Cell therapy, human embryonic stem cells, R&D projects, real options, science 
policy, technology management
INTRODUCTION
Organised within networks encompassing both academic institutions and commercial 
entities, the development of R&D projects in science-intensive industries such as the bio-
technology industry feeds off and is closely intertwined with publicly funded scientific re-
search (e.g., Cohen et al., 2002; Powell et al., 2005). Accordingly, public funding plays an 
important role in upstream R&D in these industries. While venture capitalists in Silicon 
Valley, the US region with the largest amount of early stage funding for biotechnology 
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firms, provided US$ 104 million in seed- and start-up- funding for biotechnology firms 
in 2012 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015), the National Institutes of Health (NIH) alone 
distributed US$ 258 million for biomedical research at the region’s three major research 
universities in that same year. Moreover, NIH provided an additional US$ 41 million of 
funding to Silicon Valley firms through its Small Business Innovation Research grant 
scheme (National Institutes of Health, 2015a).
Given the central role of  external scientific communities in corporate R&D projects, 
uncertainties relating to firms’ ability to rely on these communities as R&D projects 
progress, likely shape firms’ management of  these projects. The challenges these un-
certainties represent are substantial. Both the scientific knowhow a firm needs over the 
course of  an R&D project, and the new scientific knowhow that will become available 
during that period, are often difficult to predict when a firm commits resources to a new 
project.
One approach to understanding the management of  uncertainties in a firm’s exter-
nal environment emanates from the finance literature on real options. Adopting a real 
options approach entails conceptualising investments in R&D projects as investments in 
a platform, which could enable, but does not oblige a firm to bring to the market new 
products in a specific technological field in the future (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kim 
and Kogut, 1996; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004; Oriani and Sobrero, 2008; Trigeorgis and 
Reuer, 2017). However, existing real options approaches are often seen as overestimating 
R&D project valuations as these mostly rely on assessments of  uncertainties linked to 
future revenue streams, and do not sufficiently take into account other important sources 
of  uncertainty (Van Putten and MacMillan, 2004). By focusing on uncertainties about a 
firm’s external scientific environment, we expand the focus of  this literature to the role of 
uncertainties about critical input resources for R&D projects.
Specifically, we focus on uncertainties that are the result of  changes in science policy. 
Those involved in policy and regulation play an important role in shaping uncertainties 
that a firm faces in its external environment (Fabrizio, 2013; Henisz, 2000; Henisz and 
Williamson, 1999). In the case of  R&D project investments, firms have for example been 
found to strategically allocate R&D resources to minimize market uncertainties based on 
different types of  patent protection and regulatory approval requirements (Budish et al., 
2015; Olson and Yin, 2017), as well as publicly funded reimbursement schemes for new 
products that R&D projects result in (Krieger et al., 2018).
We posit that science policies that increase funding uncertainties for scientific research 
have detrimental effects for the development of  corporate R&D projects. According 
to the real options literature, a critical challenge for firms that consider irreversible, 
non-transferable resource commitments to projects is to manage uncertainties about fu-
ture supplies of  key input resources for these projects (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Kogut 
and Kulatilaka, 2001; Pindyck, 1993). Firms tend to delay or avoid such commitments 
as uncertainties increase about costs of  project inputs (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 
1993). Building on this insight we examine two effects of  increased funding uncertainties 
for public research, on firms’ management of  resource commitments to R&D projects.
First, changes in the funding outlook for public research affect considerations underlying 
the initiation of  projects. The initiation of  R&D projects in science-driven technological 
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fields generally requires firms to make substantial upfront resource commitments that 
are not transferable to other fields. To gain access to and use tacitly held scientific know-
how in specific fields, firms often set up internal corporate laboratories, as well as attract 
researchers from, and forge collaborations with academic laboratories with expertise in 
those fields (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Fabrizio, 2009; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; 
Jong, 2016; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Wong et al., 2015; Zucker et al., 1998). However, the 
ability to redeploy those R&D resources across different fields is limited. For example, a 
firm that recruits stem cell biologists from top academic laboratories to work on an R&D 
project involving stem cells will in most cases face significant hurdles in redeploying those 
scientists to projects involving small molecule- or protein- drugs. Therefore, we posit that 
increased funding uncertainties for public research in a field will make it less attractive for 
firms to make upfront resource commitments to new R&D projects in that field.
Second, changes in the funding outlook for public research in a field affect firms’ ability 
to move R&D projects down the development pathway towards the market. Advancing 
R&D projects in industries such as the biotechnology industry requires firms to forge col-
laborations across extensive interorganisational networks encompassing R&D partners, 
academic institutions, professional services firms, investors, contract manufacturers, etc. 
(Powell et al., 2005, 1996; Stuart et al., 2007). As new technological fields emerge, or-
ganisations across these networks face trade-offs about whether or not to make resource 
commitments to these fields. We argue that making such commitments becomes less at-
tractive for all organisations across these networks when the funding outlook for scientific 
research deteriorates, not only for those firms that take decisions about the initiation of 
new R&D projects. This creates an additional hurdle for innovator firms that do decide 
to commit resources to new R&D projects in a field with a negative public funding out-
look. It eventually makes it more difficult for these firms to find partners willing to com-
mit the additional resources needed to bring these projects to a successful completion.
We assess these effects in the context of  the R&D landscape of  the global cell therapy 
sector following changes in US federal policies that restricted funding for research in-
volving human embryonic stem cells (hESC) during the first decade of  the 21st century. 
The global cell therapy sector finds its origins in the 1980s. However, the sector was 
mostly focused on the commercialisation of  therapies comprising of  mature, specialised 
cells directed at a relatively small number of  therapeutic application areas with limited 
market potential up until the dawn of  the 21st century. This all changed with a series of 
discoveries that allowed researchers to isolate hESCs and use these cells in drug discovery 
during the late 1990s opening up a wider set of  opportunities to develop new therapies 
focused on pressing disease burdens in areas such as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, diabetes, 
cardiovascular-, and liver- disease. Thus, hESC research was seen as critical to the de-
velopment of  the cell therapy sector during the first decade of  the 21st century and US 
federal restrictions on hESC research were seen as potentially undermining scientific 
programs that were key for this sector (Mason and Manzotti, 2009; National Academies 
of  Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2002).
To examine the impact of  shifts in hESC funding policy on the initiation and ad-
vancement of  corporate R&D projects in the cell therapy sector, we created a unique 
dataset. It contains information on 868 worldwide deals involving the transfer of  cell 
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therapy technologies from universities to firms over the period 1986–2013, and 570 new 
commercial cell therapy projects initiated by firms from across the globe over the period 
1986–2011. We use these data to examine the initiation and advancement of  corporate 
R&D projects in the US cell therapy sector and contrast it with the initiation and ad-
vancement of  projects in the cell therapy sectors of  other countries across four periods, 
during which the funding environment for public hESC research in the US changed.
Our findings indicate a drop in the propensity of  US firms to initiate novel cell ther-
apy R&D projects as compared to firms elsewhere after the announcement of  a US 
federal funding moratorium on specific types of  hESC research in 2001. We find that 
the involvement of  universities in commercial markets for ideas in the cell therapy field 
diminished as well during this period. Focusing on the discontinuation of  R&D projects 
in the cell therapy field, our results indicate that cell therapy projects that were initiated 
by US firms during the period following the examined changes in US science policy had 
a higher propensity for failure than projects initiated by non-US firms. A further analysis 
of  our data shows that these increases in project failure rates were concentrated among 
US cell therapy projects that involved human embryonic stem cells and adult stem cells. 
Finally, we show that the drops in R&D performance we describe were reversed as the 
US funding outlook for cell therapy research stabilised and recovered.
Public Research and Novel Corporate R&D Projects
The initiation of a new R&D project in an emergent scientific field usually requires 
firms to make significant irreversible resource commitments to gain access to and use 
scientific knowledge in that field. While economists used to view scientific knowledge as 
a public good that is free to use (Arrow, 1959; Nelson, 1959), scholars nowadays tend to 
argue that scientific knowledge is not free to use. Especially knowledge at the scientific 
knowledge frontier that generally is of the greatest commercial value, often is tacitly 
held by star scientists, postdocs, and PhD students at top academic laboratories (e.g., 
Jong, 2006; Jong, 2008; Liebeskind et al., 1996; Thursby and Thursby, 2002; Zucker 
et al., 1998). Searching for and assimilating this knowledge requires firms to set up in-
ternal R&D organizations (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004), 
forge collaborations with academic laboratories (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Stuart et al., 
2007; Zucker et al., 1998), and participate in open methods of knowledge exchange such 
as through publications in scientific journals or presentations at academic conferences 
(Fabrizio, 2009; Jong, 2011; Jong and Slavova, 2014). Investments firms make in this 
context such as those in facilities to carry out specific types of experiments, in recruit-
ing scientists proficient in the state of the art in a field, or in relationships with thought 
leaders in a scientific area, often are costly to repurpose for R&D projects in other fields 
later on.
Firms’ dependency on external scientific communities in the initiation of  new R&D 
projects in industries such as the bio-, nano-, and ICT- technology industries is substan-
tial. A survey published in the 1990s found that 15 per cent of  new products developed 
by industry over the period 1986–1994 could not have been developed without recent 
advances in academic research (Mansfield, 1998, 1995). This number was substantially 
higher for new drugs and medical products, namely 31 per cent. Another 1994 survey 
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found that 41.4 per cent of  pharmaceutical drugs R&D builds on findings from public 
research, 12.3 per cent of  pharmaceutical drugs R&D relies on prototypes that resulted 
from public research, and 35.4 per cent of  pharmaceutical drugs R&D relies on instru-
ments and techniques developed through public research (Cohen et al., 2002).
Moreover, managers must consider significant uncertainties about the future availabil-
ity of  critical input resources from external scientific communities when they commit 
resources to new R&D projects. Much scientific knowledge that firms will need in order 
to bring a promising idea to the market has yet to be produced when resources are com-
mitted to new R&D projects. Moreover, technological challenges along product develop-
ment pathways and the knowledge firms need to tackle these challenges are often difficult 
to predict ex ante, especially in the development of  projects that build on cutting-edge 
scientific research. Managers do know however that tackling challenges along product 
development pathways will most likely require access to knowledge that is external to the 
firm (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Katz and Tushman, 1981; Lee and Allen, 1982; Phene 
et al., 2006), with cutting-edge academic research being a particularly important source 
of  external knowledge (Fabrizio, 2009; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Jong and Slavova, 
2014). In fact, publicly funded scientific knowledge has been found to be an equally im-
portant input in the development phase of  new R&D projects as it is in the discovery and 
initiation phase (Cohen et al., 2002).
This makes the management of  uncertainties associated with firms’ external scientific 
environment critical in R&D project initiation decisions. Some have analyzed the prob-
lem firms face in managing these uncertainties, using a real options logic. According to 
this logic, resource commitments to new R&D projects can be likened to investments in 
a platform (or portfolio of  options), which could enable, but does not oblige a firm to fur-
ther progress towards the market new products in a specific technological field at a future 
point in time (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Kim and Kogut, 1996; McGrath and Nerkar, 
2004; Oriani and Sobrero, 2008; Trigeorgis and Reuer, 2017). Two types of  uncertain-
ties tied to the external environment of  firms have been found to shape the value of 
real options that R&D projects represent, namely 1) market uncertainties such as those 
linked to competitive dynamics in a market, market payoffs, and the opportunity scope 
of  a project (Childs and Triantis, 1999; Huchzermeier and Loch, 2001; McGrath and 
Nerkar, 2004), and 2) uncertainties about how technological change shapes market struc-
tures (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Tegarden et al., 1999; Anderson and Tushman, 
1990). However, existing real options approaches are often seen as overestimating R&D 
project valuations as these mostly rely on assessments of  uncertainties linked to future 
revenue streams, and do not sufficiently take into account other important sources of 
uncertainty (Van Putten and MacMillan, 2004).
We expand existing research that uses real options approaches in examining R&D 
project initiation decisions by focusing on the role of  uncertainties about input resources. 
According to real options theory, it becomes more attractive for firms to postpone these 
decisions or to pursue other projects as uncertainties increase about the future costs 
of  critical input resources (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 2001; 
Pindyck, 1993).
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A central question in organizational theory is that of  the coordination of  resource allo-
cations within loosely structured, networked fields, of  which the biotechnology industry 
is an exemplar case (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Powell et al., 2005, 1996; Stuart 
et al., 2007). The state plays a critical role in such coordination, for example by using 
policy and regulatory action to increase or decrease uncertainty about critical aspects of 
firms’ environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Scholars have for example examined 
the impact of  increased uncertainties in the regulatory environment on firms’ willing-
ness to make asset specific investments (Henisz, 2000; Henisz and Williamson, 1999). 
Moreover, studies on corporate investments in new telecommunications infrastructure 
projects (Henisz and Zelner, 2001), and renewable energy generation projects (Fabrizio, 
2013) indicate that firms are less likely to commit to such investments when regulatory 
uncertainty is higher. Similarly, we argue that public policy and regulation affect uncer-
tainties about the outlook for scientific research in a field, which firms require access 
to for the advancement of  new R&D projects. Scientific funding policies are critical in 
regulating the development of  scientific knowledge, expertise, and skills that firms use 
as an input in corporate R&D projects. Changes in science policy may therefore either 
reinforce or undermine confidence among firms about their ability to rely on this input 
in the development of  their projects in the future.
Restrictions and uncertainties about funding for scientific research in a particular field 
have already been found to be an important factor at the level of  individual scientists in 
shaping career decisions scientists make about which fields of  scientific enquiry to focus 
on. These decisions also involve significant upfront investments. For example, scientists 
spend considerable amounts of  time and effort on becoming proficient in the state of  the 
art in a particular field, for example by writing a PhD, before they are able to reap any 
professional, financial rewards in that field. Accordingly, expectations among research-
ers about their ability to attract public funding for research in a scientific field shape 
researchers’ propensity to work on research projects in that field (Anstett and Bell 1959; 
Levine, 2006, 2008, 2012).
We build on this literature to argue that the public funding outlook for a scientific 
field is an important factor in firms’ assessment about the attractiveness of  R&D in-
vestment options in that field. We also argue that this is an effect that is geographically 
concentrated. Some have argued that laboratories in scientific fields where public science 
funding is restricted can mitigate some of  the detrimental effects caused by these restric-
tions by forging collaborations with laboratories that are located in countries with more 
favorable funding environments (Furman et al., 2012; Vakili et al., 2015). The transfer of 
scientific knowledge, however, often requires personal interactions, and as a result, com-
mercial and academic R&D in science-intensive industries tends to be geographically 
co-located (e.g., Zucker et al., 1998). This implies that while firms may mitigate some of 
the negative effects of  country-level deteriorations in the scientific funding outlook by 
forging international collaborations, these firms remain at a comparative disadvantage 
in gaining access to cutting-edge scientific knowledge relative to firms in other countries. 
Thus, we expect that the impact of  changes in the scientific funding outlook for research 
in a field is stronger for firms that are located in the geographical areas that are directly 
is affected by these changes.
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So what does this mean for our understanding of  the effects of  changes in the funding 
outlook for research in a scientific field on firms’ propensity to launch new R&D proj-
ects? Following our reasoning we expect such changes that increase uncertainties about 
funding to have a negative effect on the propensity of  firms to launch novel R&D proj-
ects. Moreover, we expect this negative effect to be stronger for firms that are geograph-
ically located in the regions where public research is affected by these changes. Thus, we 
pose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The negative impact of deteriorations in the funding outlook for scientific 
research on firms’ propensity to launch new R&D projects is larger for firms that are 
located in the geographical areas that are directly affected by these deteriorations.
Public Research and Corporate R&D Project Failure
We expect that changes in the  public funding outlook for scientific research do not only 
affect firms’ propensity to initiate new R&D projects, but also firms’ propensity to move 
projects that are initiated down the pipeline towards the market. Resource environments, 
in which R&D projects are initiated, play an important role in shaping project outcomes. 
For example, the financing environment for new technology firms is important in shap-
ing subsequent innovation outcomes (e.g., Jong, 2009; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). 
Firms that receive their initial venture capital investment in a ‘hot’ financing environ-
ments tend to be more innovative and are valued higher on the day of their initial public 
offering than firms that receive their initial venture capital investment in more restrictive 
financing environments (Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013).
We argue that a resource environment, in which the funding outlook for scientific 
research is poor, will produce R&D projects with a higher propensity of  failure than re-
source environments with a better outlook for scientific research. Product innovation in 
science-intensive sectors is organized within collaboration networks that involve extensive 
webs of  organizational actors possessing the wide range of  competencies and resources 
needed for a project’s advancement (Powell et al., 2005, 1996). Many of  these firms (e.g., 
investors, contract manufacturers, clinical trials units, legal services-, and staffing- firms) 
actually do not directly use publicly funded scientific knowledge as an input. However, 
these firms do share similar trade-offs in decisions about making upfront commitments 
of  resources to specific fields. For example, a dilemma for biopharmaceutical contract 
manufacturers at the time of  the expansion of  the cell therapy sector during the first 
decade of  the 21st century was whether or not to invest in manufacturing facilities for 
cell therapies. The costs of  such facilities are substantial (these can run into the hundreds 
of  millions of  dollars), and once facilities are set up and running, repurposing these for 
manufacturing other types of  therapies (e.g., small molecule-, protein- drugs) is not feasi-
ble. Accordingly, long-term prospects for continued business in a field are an important 
consideration in making such investments.
Following a real options logic, we argue that science policy considerations also are 
an important factor for firms that do not directly use publicly funded scientific research 
as an input resource, in managing uncertainties in the external environment. For these 
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firms, science policy likely represents a useful signal about the long-term prospects for 
additional business opportunities beyond incidental deal opportunities that may arise in 
a new field. Policies that increase uncertainties about the scientific environment in a field 
will likely decrease the real options value of  the prospects for additional business oppor-
tunities in that field. Accordingly, we expect upfront resource commitments by organi-
zations that play a supporting role to firms that initiate and develop new science-based 
R&D projects in a field, to be directed away to other fields when the public funding 
outlook for scientific research in that field becomes more uncertain. This means that even 
if  individual R&D firms are willing to commit resources to the initiation of  novel R&D 
projects in a field, for which the public funding outlook is deteriorating, managers of 
these firms will likely find it more difficult to find other firms that are willing to commit 
resources to these projects, increasing these projects’ chances of  failure.
Finally, we argue that this effect is particularly strong for firms that are based in the 
geographical areas affected by deteriorations in the funding outlook. Like for the effect 
of  funding restrictions on firms’ propensity to initiate novel R&D projects, we build on 
the notion that knowledge that is valuable in the advancement of  R&D projects in sci-
ence-intensive industries is often tacitly held and benefits of  the physical co-location 
of  critical partners. Accordingly, we argue that the negative effect of  scientific funding 
uncertainties on the propensity for failure of  corporate R&D projects in a research field 
is larger for firms that are in the country where the funding outlook for scientific research 
in that field deteriorates. Accordingly, we posit the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The negative impact of science policy changes that increase scientific 
funding uncertainties on the propensity for failure of corporate R&D projects is 
larger for projects initiated by firms that are located in the geographical areas where 
these policy changes are enacted.
METHODOLOGY
Research Setting
We examine the impact of changes in science funding policies on corporate R&D proj-
ects in the context of the global cell therapy sector over the period 1997–2011. The cell 
therapy sector is an important sub-sector in the biotechnology industry and is organised 
around the development of cells (as opposed to small molecules or proteins) as thera-
pies.1 It is moving towards the market high-profile therapies, including therapies that 
regenerate human bladder, brain, and spinal cord tissues, and that trigger or act as an 
immune response to cancer. There were a total of 366 cell therapy projects under active 
development in 2015 (Citeline, 2015).
In this study we focus on the impact of  changes in the funding outlook for human 
embryonic stem cells (hESC) on corporate R&D projects in the cell therapy sector. The 
first hESCs were isolated by the lab of  James Thomson at the University of  Wisconsin in 
1998. The scientific advances made at Thomson’s lab represented one of  the important 
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milestones that led the journal Science to proclaim stem cell research as the ‘Breakthrough 
of  the Year’ in 1999 (Vogel, 1999). The promise of  hESCs for the cell therapy sector was 
derived from the unique capacity of  these cells to renew themselves and to develop into 
the different cell types that make up the human body. Like scientific research driving 
corporate R&D agendas in the broader biotechnology industry (Liebeskind et al., 1996; 
Zucker et al., 1998), high-impact scientific research of  importance to R&D in the cell 
therapy sector was concentrated at top universities. Furman et al. (2012) found that 24 
per cent of  all publications in the hESC research field had as the reprint author a re-
searcher affiliated with a top-25 US university.
While many of  the research agendas that the isolation of  hESCs had opened up still 
were in their early stages of  development, a consensus had formed around the dawn of 
the 21st century that hESCs would be critical to the future of  the cell therapy sector. The 
first cell therapy companies date back to the late 1980s, and most of  these firms focused 
on the commercialisation of  new cell therapies that do not involve stem cells. Apligraf 
and Dermagraft are examples of  such cell therapies, consisting of  mature, specialised 
cells, that were developed during the 1980s and 1990s (Forti and Jong, 2014). These two 
therapies are skin substitute products used for foot ulcer healing that produce many of 
the same proteins and growth factors found in healthy skin. Such therapies typically re-
main viable for relatively short periods (days, weeks) and then die off.
The outlined breakthroughs in hESC research, however, heralded a much broader set of 
opportunities to develop new therapies focused on pressing disease burdens in areas such 
as Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and liver disease. A commis-
sion of  leading basic and clinical biomedical researchers that the National Academies of 
Sciences convened in 2001 focused on the role of  hESC research in the future develop-
ment of  regenerative medicine. The commission’s report put forward that new hESC lines 
would likely be critical in the advancement of  the cell therapy field, even though it was not 
possible to specify ex ante which new stem cell lines would be needed and, in which areas 
these stem cell lines would be most critical (National Academies of  Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine, 2002). This intrinsic link between the fates of  academic hESC research and 
the industrial cell therapy sector have continued to permeate the discourse about pros-
pects for the cell therapy field among external observers (e.g., Mason and Manzotti, 2009), 
senior academic researchers involved in the field (Klein et al., 2009; Wolinsky, 2008), in-
vestors (Brick, 2001), policy makers (NIH, 2015b), and industry executives.
The changes in the public funding environment for hESC research we will focus on 
in this study centre on the aftermath of  an executive order on federally funded hESC 
research that was announced in a nationally televised address by President George W 
Bush on 9 August 2001. While permitting NIH to provide grant funding for research on 
seventy-one lines of  hESCs left over from in vitro fertilisation treatments from 14 labo-
ratories prior to the instatement of  the moratorium, this executive order prohibited such 
funding for research on any newly created hESC lines.
The aftermath of  the announcement of  this moratorium provided something akin to 
a controlled ‘natural experiment’ research setting to examine the impact of  changes in 
science funding environments on academic research (Furman et al., 2012; Levine, 2012, 
2008; Owen-Smith 2006; Moon and Cho, 2014; Owen-Smith and McCormick, 2006; 
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Vakili et al., 2015). There is a number of  reasons why this setting is such a fruitful setting 
to examine the interplay between scientific funding decisions and the activities of  those 
affected by these decisions.
• The funding moratorium was enacted at a specific point in time and its scope, namely 
any research utilising hESC lines that were derived before the announcement of the 
moratorium, was clearly delineated.
• The specifics of US funding policy regarding hESC research were not known up 
until the announcement of the moratorium by President George W. Bush on 9 August 
2001. In fact, the announcement was met with considerable surprise by the media and 
scientists (Furman et al., 2012).
• The moratorium spanned a period that offered an otherwise favourable funding envi-
ronment for biomedical research. The annual NIH budget roughly doubled over the 
1995–2005 period.
• The 2001–2009 moratorium on federally funded hESC research was US-specific. 
Thus, by contrasting R&D activities of US and non-US firms before, during, and 
after the the enactment of the US federal funding moratorium on specific types of 
hESC research, we are able to control for a range of factors that are instrumental in 
supporting innovation in science-intensive industries and that change over time.
While the impact of  the various funding policy shifts in the hESC field on scientific 
programs involving human embryonic- and other types of  stem cells, has by now been 
well documented, this study will extend the existing literature on these shifts by focusing 
on their impact on corporate R&D projects.
Time Intervals
We focus our analyses on four time intervals that mark distinctive periods in terms of 
the funding outlook for cell therapy research in the US (see Table I). These intervals are 
similar to ones used by studies that examined the impact of the hESC funding mora-
torium on publications by and labour market mobility of US-based hESC researchers 
(Anstett and Bell 1959; Furman et al., 2012; Levine, 2006, 2008, 2012; Moon and Cho, 
2014; Owen-Smith and McCormick, 2006; Vakili et al., 2015).
1997–2000: Initial embrace of new hESC research programs by science policy makers. The 
isolation of embryonic stem cells at the Thomson laboratory of the University of 
Wisconsin (of monkeys in 1995; of humans in 1998), was followed by an initial embrace 
of hESC research programs by science policy makers during the last two years of 
the administration of US President Bill Clinton. During this period federal funding 
agencies were seen as positively inclined towards funding new hESC research programs 
opened up by Thomson’s discoveries, with NIH soliciting proposals for future research 
beyond existing cell lines (Furman et al., 2012). Moreover, studies on the development 
of hESC research indicate no significant cross-national differences in the growth rates 
of publications in the hESC field over this time interval (Furman et al., 2012; Moon and 
Cho, 2014; Vakili et al., 2015).
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2001–2003: The enactment of a federal moratorium on specific types of hESC research. The 2001–
2003 interval covers the first years of the funding moratorium. As federal funding 
traditionally represents the most important source of funding for basic biomedical 
research in the US, prospects to attract public funding for future hESC research were 
greatly diminished after the enactment of the 2001 hESC research funding moratorium. 
The size of the scientific effort in stem cell research was relatively small in the context of 
the broader basic and clinical biomedical research endeavour of the early 2000s. NIH 
funding for human embryonic stem cell research totalled US$ 10.7 million in 2002, 
and US$ 17 million in 2003; NIH funding for adult stem cell research totalled US$ 170 
million in 2002, and US$ 181.5 million in 2003 (The President’s Council on Bioethics 
2004). Moreover, stem cell research comprised less than 1 per cent of the total NIH 
budget, which was US$ 23.6 billion in 2002, and US$ 27.1 billion in 2003.
Several studies highlight an immediate and sizable drop in research productivity of 
US-based researchers as compared to researchers based elsewhere during the years after 
the enactment of  the moratorium (Furman et al., 2012; Moon and Cho, 2014; Owen-
Smith and McCormick, 2006; Scott et al., 2011). US knowledge production in the hESC 
field fell 35 to 40 per cent below anticipated levels, and measured in terms of  forward 
citations to core research publications in the hESC field, US-based hESC follow-on 
work declined by nearly 59 per cent relative to non-US-based research over the period 
2001–2003 (Furman et al., 2012). The federal hESC research moratorium affected the 
career mobility of  hESC researchers as well. With career prospects in the field of  hESC 
research in the US suddenly uncertain, increasing numbers of  researchers in the field 
Table I. Milestones in development of US hESC policy (1997–2011)
1997–2000 • First hESCs isolated by lab of James Thomson, University of Wisconsin-Madison in 
1998. Breakthrough followed isolation of monkey embryonic stem cells by same 
laboratory in 1996.
• Science proclaims stem cell research ‘Breakthrough of the Year’ in 1999.
2001–2003 • Reports by the National Institutes of Health (2001), and National Academies of 
Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2002) emphasize importance of further 
research on human embryonic stem cells for future of cell therapy field.
• US President George W. Bush signs executive order in August 2001 that imposes a 
federal funding moratorium on research on new human embryonic stem cell lines.
2004–2008 • California voters approve Proposition 71. The Act is also known as the California Stem 
Cell Research and Cures Act of 2004. It includes a US$ 3 billion state bonds issue to 
fund stem cell research.
• Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005 (H.R. 810) is passed by US Congress. 
The Act was supposed to pave the way for federal support for research that utilizes 
hESCs, but was vetoed by US President George W. Bush in 2006.
• Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey step in with state-level stem cell 
programs (2004–06).
2009–2011 • President Barack Obama signs executive order in 2009 that repeals Bush-era 
moratorium limiting federal tax dollars for embryonic stem cell research.
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Table II. Variables used in empirical analyses




Total number of new cell therapy projects that enter 
pre-clinical or clinical trials in a given year.
Citeline Pharmaprojects
% of non-SC 
project
The percentage of cell therapy projects initiated by a 
firm that does not involve stem cells in a given year
Citeline Pharmaprojects
% of adult SC 
projects
The percentage of cell therapy projects initiated by a 
firm that does not involve any hESCs in a given year
Citeline Pharmaprojects
% of hESC 
projects
The percentage of cell therapy projects initiated by a 
firm that involves hESCs in a given year
Citeline Pharmaprojects
Project failure A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 
therapy project is discontinued by a firm AND is not 
taken up for development by another firm. The value 
is 0 if otherwise
Citeline Pharmaprojects
Independent variables ( firm-level)
US project A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 
therapy project is initiated by a firm based in the 
United States. The value is 0 if otherwise.
Compustat, LexisNexis 
firm database
Large firms (≥ 
500 employees)
A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
which initiates a focal project had more than 500 





A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
which initiates a focal project had fewer than 50 
employees at the year the project is initiated. (medium-
sized firms is the reference group)
Compustat, LexisNexis 
firm database






Number of prior university deals of a firm at the time a 
new project is initiated.
Recap IQ Series, Deal 
Builder
No. deals Number of all prior deals of a firm at the time a new 
project is initiated.





Post2000 A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 
therapy project was initiated during or after 2000. The 
value is 0 if otherwise.
Citeline Pharmaprojects
1997–00 A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 
therapy project was initiated between 1997 and 2000. 
The value is 0 if otherwise.
Citeline Pharmaprojects
2001–03 A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 
therapy project was initiated between 2001 and 2003. 
The value is 0 if otherwise.
Citeline Pharmaprojects
(Continued )
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moved to different countries with more favourable funding environments (Anstett and 
Bell 1959; Levine, 2006, 2008, 2012).
Contemporary accounts indicate that the 2001 moratorium also affected commer-
cial R&D. These accounts suggest that the sudden policy changes and political turmoil 
around the topic, dampened the willingness of  investors to commit resources to cell 
therapy companies. Reflecting on the impact of  the 2001 hESC research moratorium 
Thomas Okarma, CEO of  Geron, one of  the leading stem cell companies during the 
2000s for example remarked:
It’s a disaster. The Bush [hESC federal research funding moratorium] decree cut 
off federal funding for research into new embryonic stem-cell lines. Investors fear 
the next shoe that might drop. Is Congress going to pass a law making [all cloning] 
Variable names Description Source
2004–08 A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 
therapy project was initiated between 2004 and 2008. 
The value is 0 if otherwise.
Citeline Pharmaprojects
2009–11 A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 
therapy project was initiated between 2009 and 2011. 





The cumulative number of patients enrolled in clinical 
trials for a focal project from the start of the project up 
until 2012.
ClinicalTrials.gov
No. clinical trials The cumulative number of clinical trials undertaken for 
a focal project from the start of the project up until 
2012.
ClinicalTrials.gov
Project duration The number of years from the time a new cell therapy 
project enters pre-clinical or clinical trials until the 
therapy hits the market (or if not completed by 2012, 
then the duration is calculated from the start of the 




Dummy variable that classifies a cell therapy as 
belonging to one of the following nine therapeutic 
classes: alimentary metabolic, anti-infective, anti-
cancer, blood clotting, cardiovascular, dermatological, 
musculoskeletal, neurological, and miscellaneous 
products
Citeline Pharmaprojects
Stem cell project A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a cell 




A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the cell 
therapy project was initiated in a country regime with 
a constrained regulatory regime that restricted 
research on hESCs during the examined period. The 
value is 0 if otherwise.
Vakili et al. (2015)
Table II. (Continued)
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illegal? How crazy is the regulatory environment going to get? In an attempt to fill 
the federal-funding void, a bunch of companies are trying to get funding to study 
adult stem cells. But investors can’t discriminate, so they’re sitting on the sidelines 
until all this controversy is sorted out. (Bloomberg Business Week 2003)
In line with these remarks, studies have highlighted that the effects of  the funding 
moratorium that was enacted in 2001, extended beyond the specific hESC programs 
the moratorium targeted. The restrictions and uncertainty the moratorium created also 
affected other interlinked research programs across the cell therapy field that do not 
involve hESCs. These for example included research programs on induced pluripotent 
stem cells (iPSCs). 40 per cent of  scientists working on iPSCs reported negative effects 
of  the hESC funding moratorium in their research (Levine, 2011). Moreover, Scott et al. 
(2011) found that the hESC research moratorium and the ensuing uncertainty about the 
general funding environment for cell therapy research, significantly held back research 
in the iPSC field.
2004–2008; Funding prospects for different types of stem cell research improve. The funding 
outlook for scientific research on stem cells significantly improved during the period 
2004–2008. While the federal funding moratorium remained in place, movements 
to strengthen funding support for stem cell research won important victories at 
state- and federal- levels. At the state level, initiatives sought to offset federal funding 
restrictions in hESC research. The most notable of these initiatives was Proposition 
71, also known as the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act, through which 
California voters in 2004 approved a US$ 3 billion state bonds issue to fund stem 
cell research. Other states that by 2006 had stepped in with local stem cell research 
programs were Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, and New Jersey (Vakili et al., 
2015).
At the federal level, a series of  victories by opponents of  the federal hESC re-
search-funding moratorium made a reversal of  the moratorium appear inevitable. The 
Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act, passed by a bipartisan majority in the US House 
of  Representatives in 2005, and subsequently by the US Senate eventually encountered 
a presidential veto. Yet, by the time of  this veto, even leading figures of  the social con-
servative movement in the Republican Party, which had been an important force behind 
the enactment of  hESC research funding restrictions, conceded that the end of  the mor-
atorium was only a matter of  time.2 After 2004, the deterioration of  the hESC research 
environment in the US was gradually reversed, and uncertainties about future funding 
support for hESC research diminished. Furman et al. (2012) highlight that the gap in 
research productivity between non-US- and US-based hESC researchers grew smaller 
after 2004 so that the production of  US hESC follow-on papers was only 29 per cent 
lower than the production of  non-US follow-on papers. Apart from a changing funding 
outlook for hESC research in the US at state and federal levels, Furman et al. (2012) 
attribute this reversal to US researchers who forged collaborative ties with international 
research groups operating in less restrictive funding environments.
1014 H. Huang and S. Jong 
© 2018 The Authors.
Journal of Management Studies published by Society for  the Advancement of Managment Studies and John Wiley 
& Sons, Ltd.
2009–2011: Bush era moratorium is reversed. The election and inauguration of Barack 
Obama sealed the fate of the Bush era moratorium in the hESC field. Ending funding 
limits on hESC research imposed by the moratorium had been an important campaign 
promise during the presidential election. President Obama fulfilled his campaign prom-
ise and ended the Bush era moratorium using an executive order in March 2009. This 
period also coincided with the height of the financial crisis that followed the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008, which led to a general deterioration of the private funding 
environment for R&D-intensive companies.
Data Analysis
Project initiation. Hypothesis 1 relates to the impact of deteriorations in the outlook for 
scientific research in a field on the initiation of corporate R&D projects. To test this 
hypothesis, we implement a difference in differences analysis to estimate the impact 
of the 2001 policy intervention on the initiation of corporate cell therapy projects. 
Difference in differences is a commonly used econometric technique that estimates the 
effect of a specific (policy) intervention or (medical) treatment by comparing changes in 
outcomes before and after the intervention between a control and a treatment group. 
The advantage of a difference in differences analysis is to obtain the treatment effect 
while accounting for unobserved variables that are assumed to be fixed over time 
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Zhou et al., 2016). We implement this technique to capture 
differences in project trajectories before and after policy events that changed the outlook 
for cell therapy research in the US.
Specifically, we focus on changes in the numbers of  cell therapies that enter preclin-
ical or clinical trials in the US and outside the US, before and after the enactment of 
the US federal hESC research funding moratorium. The number of  projects that enter 
preclinical or clinical studies is a good proxy to assess resource commitment decisions 
related to market entry in the life sciences industry (e.g., Pisano 2006). The commer-
cialisation of  new medicines is governed by a strict regulatory framework, within which 
firms are required to collect and report to regulators data on the safety and efficacy of 
these medicines. Data are collected in preclinical studies, and subsequently in phase 1, 
2, and 3 human subject studies that typically escalate in scale, complexity, and costs as 
these studies progress to the next stage. Investments in clinical trials constitute the most 
resource-intensive part of  the biopharmaceutical R&D process; A 2006 study estimates 
clinical trials costs for new drugs that are developed by major biopharmaceutical com-
panies to run between US$ 500 million and in excess of  US$ 2 billion (Adams and 
Brantner, 2006). Therefore, investment decisions by firms linked to the initiation of  (pre-) 
clinical trials constitute a useful indicator of  R&D priorities firms set across disease areas.
Project failure. Hypothesis 2 focuses on the impact of changes in the outlook for public 
research in a field on the propensity for failure of corporate R&D projects initiated by 
companies in that field. To test this hypothesis we focus on discontinuation rates of cell 
therapy projects initiated by US- and non-US- firms before and after the enactment of 
the US federal hESC research funding moratorium. As the biopharmaceutical product 
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development process is so costly, risky, and protracted over time, traditional markers of 
R&D success such as sales or even products on the market are problematic. For example, 
by 2015, the global R&D effort of the cell therapy sector of the preceding 20 years 
had yielded no more than 32 cell therapies on the market (Citeline, 2015). Accordingly, 
industry practitioners and observers use alternative proxies for R&D performance 
and value creation, with the progression of projects along the different stages of the 
preclinical and clinical testing trajectory being the most widely used. Firms realize a 
significant amount of value during the clinical trials process, well before any product 
hits the market. For example, in its acquisition of Pharmasset that was announced at the 
end of 2011, Gilead Sciences in essence paid US$ 11 billion for a hepatitis C drug that 
was in clinical trials phase 2 of the drug development path (Grocer, 2011).
Data sources. We collected data on the development of the corporate R&D landscape in 
cell therapy from multiple sources.
Project-level variables. We used the Citeline Pharmaprojects database to collect information 
on cell therapy projects that were under active development at any time over the period 
1986–2011. The Citeline Pharmaprojects database is a leading industry database that 
has tracked clinical trials in the global biopharma industry since the mid-1980s. Citeline 
Pharmaprojects data is compiled by an editorial team from a range of public sources 
(e.g., clinicaltrials.gov, press releases, news coverage, international conferences) as well 
as through direct communication with companies. Because of the scale and scope of the 
coverage of the database as well as because it is public, Citeline Pharmaprojects is both 
widely used for market research and scientific studies using pharmaceutical industry 
product development data (e.g., Aggarwal and Hsu, 2014; Bierly and Charkrabarti, 
1996; Cardinal, 2001; Sosa, 2011). Despite its good coverage of the biopharmaceutical 
R&D landscape, Citeline Pharmaprojects does not cover projects that companies do not 
disclose. While firms might be less likely to disclose projects that are at earlier stages of 
the development process, there is no reason to suspect that there is a systematic difference 
in underreporting for different types of projects.
Citeline Pharmaproject’s editorial team categorizes each project that is in the database 
according to the source material for the project – the most important distinction being 
between protein-, small molecule-, and cell therapy- projects. Accordingly, we were able 
to identify all the projects in the Citeline Pharmaprojects database that are cell therapies. 
In total, we extracted information on 592 cell therapy projects that entered development 
from 1986 until June 2012. For the purpose of  our analyses, we only use projects initiated 
from 1997 until the end of  2011. Accordingly, we ended up with a total of  538 projects 
for our analyses.
From the Citeline Pharmaprojects dataset, we collected project-level data, including 
data on the project initiation year, and the status of  the cell therapy project in 2014. The 
Citeline Pharmaprojects dataset indicates the status of  a project, classifying it as discon-
tinued, suspended, licensed out, taken up for development by another firm, or active. 
We categorize failed projects as those listed as suspended or terminated. Using informa-
tion from ClinicalTrials.gov, we found that of  the 538 cell therapies, 71 per cent were 
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undergoing preclinical trials, 12.4 per cent were in phase 1 studies, 10.4 per cent were in 
phase 2 studies, and 6.2 per cent were in phase 3 studies. For discontinued projects (N = 
355), we found that 80 per cent had failed in preclinical trials and 20 per cent had failed 
in clinical trials.
Based on the Citeline Pharmaprojects project descriptions for the cell therapy projects 
in our sample, we categorized all projects in our sample (both active and discontinued 
projects) based on whether these were stem cell therapy projects (N = 264) or non-stem 
cell therapy projects (N = 274). Of  the 264 stem cell projects, only 9 per cent (N = 23) 
were hESC projects.3 Due to the small number of  cases of  hESC projects, this study is 
not able to test the effect of  changes in the funding outlook on the initiation and failure 
of  hESC R&D projects only; instead we focus in our analyses on the broader set of 
interlinked research programs that make up the cell therapy field. As highlighted, the 
examined policy changes reverberated across this entire field.
We used other sources to construct several project-level measures. From the 
ClinicalTrials.gov database website, we obtained information on numbers of  clinical tri-
als and patient enrollments for each project. To account for different national hESC pol-
icy environments, we adopted Vakili et al.’s (2015) categorization of  countries based on 
whether countries where projects were initiated, offered a regulatory environment that 
was ‘constrained’ (i.e., restrictive) for research on hESCs (e.g., Austria, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland), or a regulatory environment that was ‘flexible’ (i.e., per-
missive) for research on hESCs (e.g., UK, China, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan). About 
one-third of  non-US projects were projects initiated in countries with a ‘constrained’ 
regulatory environment, and 72 per cent of  non-US projects were projects initiated in 
countries with a ‘flexible’ regulatory environment.
For the 538 cell therapy projects in our sample, we identified 221 companies as ini-
tiators of  projects. Of  these 221 firms, approximately half  are US-based firms (56 per 
cent). 16 per cent of  firms are large firms with more than 500 employees and 56 per 
cent are small firms with fewer than 50 employees. The average number of  cell therapy 
projects per firm is 2.5 over the research period of  our paper, with a standard deviation 
of  2.4, a median of  1, and a mode number of  1. The descriptive statistics show that 55 
per cent of  firms in our sample introduced only a single project. The 75th percentile is 
three projects.
We assembled firm-level data from a range of  business intelligence sources on the 221 
firms that initiated the development of  the cell therapies in our sample (e.g., Compustat-
Capital IQ, Factiva, Hoover’s, Google, and Bloomberg.com). These data help us as-
certain that observed differences in R&D project initiation and failure rates inside and 
outside the US were not the result of  firm heterogeneity.
Finally, we collected data from the Thomson-Reuters’ Recap database on the 
involvement of companies in technology transfer deals in the cell therapy field, including 
those with academic institutions, and the years when these deals were announced. The 
Thomson-Reuters’ Recap database is one of the leading international databases on 
technology licensing deals in the biopharmaceutical industry. The Thomson-Reuters’ 
editorial team specifies for each deal whether it involves cell therapies. Accordingly, 
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we were able to use the Recap database to identify a total of 864 technology transfer 
deals in the cell therapy field between 1986 and 2011. To account for a company’s 
R&D experience and capability, we later used these data to construct two additional 
firm-level measures to quantify 1) a firm’s total number of prior collaborations with 
outside organizations, and 2) a firm’s total number of prior collaborations with academic 
institutions. Table II contains an overview of the variables and data sources we used in 
our analyses.
Descriptive Statistics
Table III presents descriptive statistics for cell therapy projects in our sample. 
Characteristics of US and non-US projects are roughly similar in terms of project du-
ration, the number of clinical trials that are associated with a project, and the size of 
patient enrollments in clinical trials. T-tests are statistically insignificant between the 
two groups. Failure rates are slightly higher for US projects than for non-US projects 
(69.3% vs. 61.6%, χ2 = 3.43, p = 0.064). We find that non-US projects are more likely 
to be launched by larger, older firms, with fewer prior licensing deals. As mentioned be-
fore, we identified 264 stem cell therapy projects, including 23 projects involving human 
embryonic stem cells in our sample. Both half of the US- and half of the non-US projects 
are stem cell therapy projects, with the t-test being insignificant between the two groups. 
There were very few hESC projects initiated in the US (5.2%) and outside the US (3.0%, 
χ2 = 1.58, p = 0.209), with the t-test being insignificant. This suggests a similar distri-
bution of stem cell and non-stem cell therapy projects for the US- and non-US- samples. 
Finally, we also provide a correlation matrix to check for the collinearity between the 
continuous variables (See Table IV).
Figure 1 plots over time data on the initiation of  US and non-US cell therapy projects 
that entered preclinical or clinical trials. Figure 1 highlights comparatively low numbers 
of  product development projects launched by US firms in the immediate aftermath of 
the enactment of  the hESC federal funding moratorium. Whereas in 2002, US firms 
initiated twenty-six new cell therapy projects and non-US firms initiated five new cell 
therapy projects, this situation reversed in 2005. In that year, US firms initiated ten new 
cell therapy projects, as compared to twenty-four new cell therapy projects initiated by 
non-US firms. Figure 1 also highlights a rebound in the number of  cell therapy proj-
ects that US firms initiated following the launch of  state initiatives aimed at providing 
funding support for stem cell research, most notably California’s Proposition 71 that 
Californians passed in 2004. In fact, figure 1 illustrates that US firms again were leading 
in annual numbers of  cell therapy projects that were initiated by 2006. It is notable that 
the US cell therapy sector experienced a second significant drop in annual project initia-
tions in 2009, after the collapse of  Lehman Brothers and the ensuing great recession that 
hit the entire economy. However, this second drop in R&D output of  the US cell therapy 
sector coincided with a similar drop in R&D activity of  the cell therapy sectors outside 
the US, which were also affected by the financial crisis. Moreover, we start to again see 
an increase in the number of  cell therapy projects from 2011 onwards as the recovery of 
the great recession sets in.
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Table III. Descriptive statistics for cell therapy projects initiated between 1997 and 2011
Variables
US projects Non-US projects All projects
(N = 306) (N = 232) (N = 538)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
DV: Project discontinua-
tion (D)
69.3% 0.46 61.6% 0.48 65.8% 0.46
IV: Project-level 
variables
(1) Project initiation 
period:
1997–00 (D) 19.2% 0.39 8.2% 0.27 14.5% 0.35
2001–03 (D) 20.2% 0.40 11.6% 0.32 16.5% 0.37
2004–08 (D) 38.9% 0.49 46.1% 0.50 42.0% 0.49
2009–11 (D) 21.5% 0.41 34.0% 0.47 26.9% 0.44
(2) Stem cell project (D) 50.0% 0.50 48.0% 0.50 49.1% 0.50
(3) hESC project (D) 5.2% 0.22 3.0% 0.17 4.3% 0.20
(2) Project duration 
(years)
4.5 2.8 4.1 2.4 4.3 2.7
(3) No. patients enrolled 
in clinical trials
91.3 433.1 88.2 778.9 89.9 607.1
(4) Number of clinical 
trials
0.66 1.5 0.53 1.0 0.60 1.4
IV: Firm-level variables
(1) Firm size:
Large firm (>= 500 
employees) (D)




32.3% 0.46 35.7% 0.49 34.8% 0.47
Small firm (<= 50 
employees) (D)
57.5% 0.49 48.7% 0.50 53.7% 0.49
(2) Firm age 10.3 19.0 18.6 38.3 13.8 29.0
(3) No. prior university 
deals
0.68 1.26 0.09 0.29 0.42 1.01
(4) No. prior deals 3.12 5.3 0.81 1.5 2.12 4.3
(5) No. prior cell therapy 
projects
2.37 2.05 2.35 2.37 2.36 2.20
Note: (1) D denotes binary variables; (2) The numbers in the US versus non-US columns indicate the average proportion 
of occurring cases for each variable between US-projects and non-US projects. For example, 69 per cent of US-projects 
and 61.6 per cent of non-US projects failed during the examined period.
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Table IV provides an overview of  information we collected from the Thomson-Reuters 
Recap database on technology transfer deals in cell therapy. Our data suggest that the 
drops in university output in the cell therapy field that followed the enactment of  the 
2001 hESC federal funding moratorium were not confined to publications; Data also 
show a drop in university participation in commercial markets for cell therapy technol-
ogies. Firms benefit more from scientific input when technologies are more novel and 
radically innovative (e.g., Fleming and Sorenson, 2004; Zucker et al., 1998). Consistent 
with this insight, we find that the prevalence of  cell therapy deals involving universities 
as a proportion of  the total number of  deals in cell therapy was highest during the 
field’s early history. Thirty-five per cent of  128 cell therapy deals were deals involving 
universities over the period 1986–1996. The prevalence of  deals involving US academic 
institutions subsequently dropped and was around twenty-one per cent for most of  the 
period 1997–2011, with the exception of  the period 2001–2003, which immediately fol-
lowed the enactment of  the federal hESC research funding moratorium. During this pe-
riod, the prevalence of  deals involving US academic institutions in the cell therapy field 
dropped to 10.3 per cent. Notably, the unusual drop of  university-industry deals over the 
period 2001–2003 appears to have been a non-trivial phenomenon that was specific to 
the cell therapy field. Table IV – column (4) highlights that university-industry deals in 
the biotechnology industry as a whole actually increased to 255 deals per year over the 
2001–2003 period compared to 215 deals per year over the preceding period, and the 
overall trend continued to be upward afterwards.
Figure 1. Number of cell therapy projects entering (pre-)clinical trials by originator country (N = 570) 
Source: Compiled from Citeline Pharmaprojects database ( June 2012).
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RESULTS
Changes in the Corporate R&D Landscape in Cell Therapy – Project 
Initiations
We construct a panel dataset with data on the 221 firms that initiated new cell ther-
apy projects between 1992 and 2011 to examine the trend illustrated in Figure 1 more 
closely.4 We use this dataset to assess the deterioration in the funding outlook for cell 
therapy research caused by the impact of the 2001 federal funding moratorium on the 
propensity of non-US and US companies to initiate novel cell therapy projects.
We estimate the basic equation as follows:
where i  indicates the firm and t the year, while i is a fixed effect for each firm and 
t−firmestyr indicates the age of  the firm. 0 is the coefficient for the interaction term of 
USi ∗ (t ≥2001), identifying the difference in project initiation rates between US firms 
and non-US firms. 1 captures the effect of  a firm’s prior involvement and experience in 
markets for technology in the cell therapy sector in year t.
We further test equation (2) and (3) to assess the impact of  government funding restric-
tions across different periods.
and
The first four models in Table VI outline a series of  difference in differences results of 
our regression analysis that uses a conditional fixed effects negative binominal method to 
estimate the dependent variable #projectsit. OLS is not appropriate for count models as 
our number of  projects measure is highly skewed and over-dispersed. We use conditional 
fixed effect negative binomial models to address the overdispersion problem of  the data 
– the conditional variance is larger than the conditional mean suggested by Hausman et 
al. (1984) and Allison and Waterman (2002). Model 5–1 tests the impact of  the enact-
ment of  the moratorium on specific types of  hESC research after 2001. The coefficient 
of  the variable USxPost2001 describes the average difference in the number of  projects 
initiated by US- and non-US- firms over the years 2001–2011, controlling for firm age, 
prior university deals, and firm-fixed effects. This coefficient is negative and significant, 
suggesting that relative to non-US firms, project initiations by US firms declined after 
2001. Specifically, incidence-rate ratios, which refer to the percentage change compared 
to the reference group, indicate that projects initiated by US firms fell by about 60 per 
cent during this period.
(1)
#projectsit = f (i +t−firmestyr +0USi ∗ (t ≥2001)+1x1i +it)
(2)
#projectsit =f (i +t−firmestyr +0USi ∗ (2001−2003)+1USi ∗ (2004−2008)
+2USi ∗ (2009−2011)+3x1i +it)
(3)
#projectsit =f (i +t−firmestyr +0USi ∗ (t =2000)+1USi ∗ (t =2001)





+5USi ∗ (2009−2011)+6x1i +it)
 Public Funding for Science and the Value of Corporate R&D Projects 1023
© 2018 The Authors.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1024 H. Huang and S. Jong 
© 2018 The Authors.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































 Public Funding for Science and the Value of Corporate R&D Projects 1025
© 2018 The Authors.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1026 H. Huang and S. Jong 
© 2018 The Authors.
Journal of Management Studies published by Society for  the Advancement of Managment Studies and John Wiley 
& Sons, Ltd.
Model 5–2 examines project initiation rates for different policy periods. The coef-
ficients for US*Year indicate gaps between the project initiation rates of  non-US and 
US firms for different periods. We see a negative impact of  funding restrictions on US-
initiated projects compared with the baseline 1997–2000 period. The first policy-shock 
interval (2001–2003) has a negative but not significant impact on project initiations by 
US firms. For the second policy interval (2004–2008), the negative impact on project 
initiations by US firms is stronger, suggesting that there might be a lag between deteri-
orations in the funding outlook and the lower propensity of  firms to initiate new R&D 
projects in a field. To test this, we ran an additional model by breaking down the policy 
intervals into smaller year-intervals (see results in model 5–3). Based on the result, we still 
do not find a negative difference between US- and non-US- firms in project initiation 
rates in year 2000 and year 2001, but we do find a large and significant difference from 
2003 onwards.
Because of  the heterogeneity in regulatory environments governing hESC research 
outside the US (with policies in some countries rivaling those in the US in terms of 
the restrictions imposed on hESC research), we might be underestimating the effects of 
US funding restrictions. Using Vakili et al.’s (2015) categorization of  countries based on 
whether these offered a constrained policy environment that was restrictive for research 
on hESCs, or an hESC flexible policy environment that was permissive for research on 
hESCs, we also run additional analyses for robustness checks. We excluded non-US cell 
therapy projects initiated by firms in hESC-constrained policy environments from our 
sample. Results of  model 5–4 are consistent with model 5–2 except for the stronger co-
efficients. Thus, findings from model 5–2 and 5–3 highlight a delayed reduction in the 
propensity of  US firms to initiate novel cell therapy projects following the deterioration 
in the funding outlook for the field in 2001. Our results show this delay to be approxi-
mately 1–2 years long (the policy change was announced and enacted during the second 
half  of  2001).
So to what extent did the effects of  the hESC moratorium enacted by the Bush ad-
ministration extend across the cell therapy field? And to what extent did firms curtail 
the initiation of  cell therapy projects that were linked to scientific programs that were 
not directly linked to hESC research? To answer this question, we construct three new 
measures for each company per year, namely 1) the percentage of  cell therapy projects 
initiated by a firm that do not involve any stem cells, 2) the percentage of  cell therapy 
projects initiated by a firm that do not involve any hESCs, and 3) the percentage of  cell 
therapy projects initiated by a firm that involve hESCs. Because all our three dependent 
variables are between 0 and 1, we run fractional probit regression models with organi-
zational fixed effects for panel data to investigate shifts in firms’ propensity to commit 
resources to R&D projects linked to different types of  cell therapies. Models 5–5, 5–6, 
and 5–7 highlight the results. In model 5–5, we do not find evidence for a relative de-
crease in the propensity of  US firms to initiate cell therapy projects that do not involve 
stem cells after the 2001 policy change. Our results do indicate a comparative drop in 
the percentage of  cell therapy projects that were initiated by US firms and were hESC 
research projects over the 2001–2003 period (model 5–7), and a similar drop in the per-
centage of  cell therapy therapy projects that were initiated by US firms and were adult 
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stem cell projects over the period 2004–08 (model 5–6). Thus, while the negative impact 
on hESC project initiations by US firms that was brought about by the federal funding 
moratorium on specific types of  hESC research in the US was immediate, the impact on 
initiations of  cell therapy projects tied to interlinked scientific programs in the adult stem 
cell research fields followed a lag period of  several years.
Changes in the Corporate R&D Landscape in Cell Therapy – R&D 
Performance
Next, we move to Hypotheses 2. Table VI presents logit regression models that assess 
firms’ propensity to discontinue cell therapy projects across four time intervals with dis-
tinctive funding outlooks for cell therapy research. To assess the short-term effect of the 
hESC research funding restrictions on project discontinuations and any spillover effects 
of these restrictions beyond the US, we employ difference in differences techniques in 
analyzing our entire sample of US- and non-US- R&D projects. We examine interac-
tion effects between where and when a project was initiated in predicting project failure. 
Using projects initiated before 2001 as the reference group, model 6–1 is the base model 
and only includes the policy variable on project failure. The coefficient Post2001 indi-
cates that projects initiated after 2001 are expected to have lower odds of failure than 
those started before the moratorium was put in place. The marginal effects at the mean 
for Post2001 is estimated to be −0.267, which tells us that the predicted probability of 
failure is 0.267 lower for projects initiated after 2001 than for those initiated before 2001. 
In addition, we do not find a significant difference in terms of odds of project failure 
between US-projects and non-US-projects in the post-2001 period (see model 6–2). We 
do find a significant effect following the enactment of hESC US funding restrictions by 
dividing up the post-policy period into different time intervals. Model 6–3 uses projects 
initiated over the period 2009–2011 as the reference group and highlights that projects 
launched before 2009 were more likely to fail, controlling for firm- and project- level 
variables, as well as organizational fixed effects. Project duration and number of clinical 
trials are negatively associated with project failure. Not only are the coefficients statis-
tically significant, results of the marginal effects at the mean suggest that a project that 
lasts a year longer, has a 5 per cent decrease in the probability of failure holding other 
variables at their mean. Moreover, one additional clinical trial will lead to a 15 per cent 
decrease in the project’s probability of failure.
Model 6–4 includes US*Year interactions to compare failure rates of  projects initiated 
by US firms versus those by non-US firms during different periods. Results show that 
projects are less likely to fail as these projects progress towards the market, which is 
consistent with existing research on product attrition rates along different stages of  the 
clinical trials process (e.g., Pisano 2006). The results of  model 6–4 highlight a positive 
and significant coefficient for interaction terms USx2001–2003, suggesting that projects 
initiated over the period 2001–03 by US firms were more likely to fail than those initiated 
by non-US firms. The coefficient for interaction terms USx2004–2008 turns negative 
and not significant compared with non-US projects launched during the same period. 
This result also suggests that the propensity for project failure of  cell therapy projects 
initiated by US firms dropped and was no different than those initiated by non-US firms 
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during the period 2004–08. Based on results of  model 6–4, among all the cell therapy 
projects initiated during 2009 and 2011, there was no difference between failure rates 
between US and non-US projects.5 Considering the possible lagged effect of  policy or 
strategic behavior speeding up or slowing down projects, we exclude the 2001 cohort 
because of  potential endogeneity problems and the results of  the econometric model 
(unreported) remain similar to results of  model 6–4. We also exclude projects in countries 
outside the US documented as having ‘constrained’ (i.e., restrictive) policies towards the 
development of  hESC research (Vakili et al., 2015). The results are similar to the results 
of  our baseline model, but with a stronger significance level for our key policy variable. 
This indicates that US-projects initiated during the period 2001–2003 were more likely 
to fail compared to non-US projects from the same cohort.
To deal with the fact that coefficients and their significance levels might not repre-
sent accurate relationships in non-linear logistic models such as logit models, we also 
estimate the marginal effects of  the interaction terms (Ai and Norton, 2003; Karaca-
Mandic et al., 2012) to calculate the predicted probability of  project failure. Figure 2 
illustrates our estimates of  model 6–4 and highlights that projects initiated by US 
firms had a significantly higher predicted probability of  failure (94 per cent) than 
projects initiated by non-US firms (78 per cent) over the 2001–2003 period based on 
a 95 per cent confidence interval, indicating a marginal effect of  around 16 per cent 
(p < 0.05). Our marginal effect results also indicate that compared with the pre-2001 
era, the difference in differences probability of  failure between pre-2001 (1997–2000) 
and post-2001 (2001–2003) projects is about 14.5 per cent. Moreover, we observe that 
predicted probabilities of  project failure between the two groups again become similar 
after 2004.
Model 6–5 examines further possible selection issues. Our descriptive results do not 
indicate that certain type of  cell therapy projects are less likely to fail than others. 
However, this does not preclude that companies select projects that are less likely to 
fail. As highlighted, models 5–6 and 5–7 in Table VI indicate that changes in the fund-
ing outlook for cell therapy research appear to have altered trade-offs firms faced in 
selecting the type of  cell therapy projects to pursue. Specifically, our data highlight 
shifts in the type of  cell therapy projects US firms initiated away from hESC projects 
(2001–03) and adult stem cell projects (2004–08). As highlighted, while the outlined US 
policy changes were seen as undermining the scientific basis underpinning growth of 
the entire cell therapy sector, the outlook was especially bleak for those R&D projects 
involving stem cells. Accordingly, companies appear to have particularly shied away 
from those types of  projects. To correct for the resulting selection bias favoring the se-
lection of  certain cell therapy projects over others, we ran a Heckman selection model 
for probit models.6
We first predict the likelihood of  being a stem cell project versus a non-stem cell proj-
ect conditioned on firm- and project-level characteristics (including firm size, firm age, 
project material, and the number of  patents registered with the project). We used the 
estimated result to predict project discontinuation rates. The choice of  the endogenous 
selection variable is shown to be significantly valid based on the likelihood ratio test, 
suggesting the selection model is better than the probit models. Model 6–5 presents the 
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results of  this analysis and shows that the policy effect becomes not significant when we 
exclude the selection effect of  picking the stem cell projects. This result confirms that 
firms with capabilities in the cell therapy field appear to have been strategic in selecting 
types of  cell therapy projects to minimize exposure to deteriorations in the external sci-
entific environment caused by policy changes.
Discussion of Findings
Our contribution to this special issue used the science commercialization context to 
advance a number of theoretical- and practitioner- debates about the management of 
R&D projects. In terms of advancing theory, our study sheds a novel light on critical 
factors affecting decisions about the initiation and advancement of corporate R&D proj-
ects. We accomplish this by building on and extending contributions on the use of real 
options theory in business decision making around R&D projects. Real options theory 
provides insights into how firms manage uncertainties that factor into such decision 
making. Moreover, existing real options approaches that are used in the valuation of 
R&D projects primarily rely on assessments of uncertainties linked to markets (Childs 
and Triantis, 1999; Huchzermeier and Loch, 2001; McGrath and Nerkar, 2004), and 
technological changes that (re)shape market structures (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; 
Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Tegarden et al., 1999). However, because existing real 
options approaches do not consider uncertainties beyond those linked to revenues, these 
approaches are often seen as overestimating valuations (Van Putten and MacMillan, 
2004). Our research extends the focus of the existing literature by looking into the im-
portant role of uncertainties linked to input resources in R&D project management. 
Specifically, we zoomed in on the firm’s external scientific environment as an important 
source of input resources. Using the aftermath of policy changes that led to a deterio-
ration of the public funding outlook for cell therapy research in the US as a case study, 
our contribution highlights several ways, through which firms managed uncertainties 
relating to this environment.
First, we highlight how increased uncertainties affect the initiation of  new corporate 
R&D projects. We find that higher levels of  uncertainty about the future outlook for 
scientific research in a field, decrease firms’ propensity to commit resources and initiate 
novel R&D projects in that field. Moreover, we find that this is an effect that is geograph-
ically concentrated. Our data show a diminished propensity for US firms vis a vis non-US 
firms to initiate new cell therapy projects after a number of  policy changes diminished 
the outlook for scientific research in cell therapy in the US. Also, we find this effect to be 
stronger for the specific scientific subfields, for which the effects of  these policy changes 
were more pronounced. We disentangled the effects of  changes in the outlook for scien-
tific research in the cell therapy field on the initiation of  different types of  cell therapy 
projects by US firms. Specifically, we analyzed differential effects on the initiation of  cell 
therapy projects involving hESCs, adult stem cells, and of  projects not involving stem 
cells. Our analyses highlight that US firms especially steered away from the types of  cell 
therapy projects that were most directly affected by the examined policy shocks, namely 
those projects involving stem cells.
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Second, we find an effect on project failure that is also geographically concentrated. 
Our analyses highlight increased log odds of  project failure for cell therapy projects initi-
ated by US firms vis a vis non-US firms during the aftermath of  the policy changes with 
regards to hESC research in the US. This finding indicates that increased uncertainties 
about the availability of  scientific input resources create an additional hurdle for innova-
tor firms that do decide to commit resources to new R&D projects in a field with a neg-
ative outlook for scientific research. These uncertainties appear to make it more difficult 
for these firms to find partners willing to commit the additional resources needed to bring 
these projects to a successful completion. This finding expands existing research that ex-
amines interdependencies in the orchestration of  resources necessary to advance R&D 
projects in so-called ‘networked’ industries such as the biotechnology industry (Powell 
et al., 2005, 1996; Stuart et al., 2007). Moreover, it helps us expand existing research on 
how the development of  technology projects is shaped by the external environment for 
critical input resources, in which these projects are conceived beyond the realm of  firms’ 
financing environment (e.g., Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013).
Our findings also provide important insights into the role of  policy makers and regula-
tion in shaping corporate R&D project management. Recent studies that examine which 
R&D project opportunities firms pursue and which R&D projects firms cast aside, high-
light the important role of  the regulatory environment (e.g., patent system, reimburse-
ment rules) in shaping market uncertainties (Budish et al., 2015; Krieger et al., 2018; 
Olson and Yin, 2017). Our findings emphasize the central role of  those involved in pol-
icy making as well. Specifically, (political) debates about policies can affect uncertainties 
driving R&D resource allocation decisions in industry in meaningful ways, even in the 
absence of  actual changes in the policies that are in place. In fact, some of  the effects we 
observed appear to have been the result of  firms’ efforts to anticipate changes in policy 
or to respond to changes in the likelihood of  such changes. Thus, shifting expectations 
about funding priorities rather than any meaningful changes in actual funding levels 
for scientific research can be the most important factor shaping corporate R&D project 
management. For example, we find a decisive uptake of  corporate R&D projects in the 
US cell therapy sector from 2005 onwards. This uptake occurred as the political move-
ment against the moratorium, and in favor of  greater state- and federal- funding support 
for stem cell research gained momentum, but before most of  this support had actually 
materialized. Accordingly, the greater propensity of  US firms to commit R&D resources 
to cell therapy projects from 2005 onwards appears initially to have been mostly driven 
by a reversal of  the funding outlook for public stem cell research, rather than by actual 
increases in funding.
Our findings also illustrate how shifts in policy that affect the outlook for scientific re-
search may cause (negative) externalities and spillovers that are unintended. For example, 
the magnitude of  the effects of  policy changes that we find for project initiation- and 
discontinuation- rates stand out. Proponents of  the 2001 hESC funding moratorium 
asserted that because of  its limited scope (the moratorium neither completely banned 
hESC research, nor restricted private and state-level funding), effects on corporate R&D 
activities and industry competitiveness would be limited in size. However, this assertion 
did not account for the unintended consequences our findings highlight. In fact, the drop 
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in innovation activity in the cell therapy field in the immediate aftermath of  the enact-
ment of  the federal hESC research funding moratorium was disproportionately large in 
relationship to the size of  hESC research in the broader stem cell research field. HESC 
research was a nascent field in 2001 and still today represents a fraction of  scholarly ac-
tivities in the stem cell research field. In 2012, three years after the federal hESC research 
funding moratorium had been reversed by executive order, US$ 146 million of  the US$ 
1.4 billion NIH funding for stem cell research was used for hESC research (NIH, 2015a). 
Yet, our data show a 77 per cent drop in the number of  new cell therapy projects entering 
(pre-)clinical trials over the period 2002–2004 (from 26 cell therapy projects that entered 
(pre-)clinical trials in 2002, to 13 in 2003, and to 6 in 2004). Thus, the restrictions on 
hESC research that were enacted in 2001 appear to have led to negative externalities and 
spill-over effects affecting the entire cell therapy field. Specifically, our analyses highlight 
that the increased funding uncertainty for the entire cell therapy field that was brought 
about by these restrictions supressed corporate R&D activity well beyond the research 
fields targeted by the federal funding restrictions.
Finally, our findings open up promising avenues for further research. While the specific 
research setting of  this study offers a unique lens on the mechanisms, through which 
uncertainties about critical input resources affect the development of  corporate R&D 
projects, the scope of  this study – namely the imposition (and reversal) of  a funding 
Figure 2. Predicted failure rates for projects initiated by US and non-US firms. The above figure illustrates 
the comparison of predicted probability of project failure between US-projects and Non-US projects at 
different year-interval based on the results of model 6–4. This plot indicates the 95 per cent confidence 
interval [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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moratorium that causes a deterioration of  the outlook for scientific research within a 
comparatively narrow set of  scientific programs – is a limited one. Accordingly, further 
research will be needed to develop a more fine-grained understanding of  the many other 
ways, in which those involved in policy and regulation affect the uncertainties firms face 
about critical input resources. Such policies may for example include policies aimed at 
funding scientific infrastructures that can also be used by industry, and the use of  positive 
funding incentives to redirect scientific R&D efforts to specific R&D fields. In addition, 
science policies are only one of  a series of  levers those involved in policy have at their dis-
posal in shaping the environment for critical input resources firms rely on. For example, 
policies and laws governing the mobility of  (international) workers, and financing also 
represent promising avenues to better understand the external environment that shapes’ 
firms engagement with R&D projects in different fields.
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NOTES
 [1] Boundaries and definitions used to delineate the scope of what we now refer to as the cell therapy 
sector have evolved over time. The concept of ‘cell therapy’ that refers to ‘human cells’ (as opposed 
to small molecule- or protein- drugs) as therapies, encompasses other, related concepts such as ‘re-
generative medicine’, ‘stem cell’, and ‘tissue engineering,’ that were more commonly used at various 
points in the past to refer to the R&D focus of the sector we examine in this study (Culme-Seymour 
and Mason 1990).
 [2] For example, the day after the Presidential veto, the New York Times quoted Gordon H. Smith, 
Republican Senator of Oregon, ref lecting on the veto and future prospects of a repeal of the morato-
rium: “When there’s another election, another chapter of democracy opens,’’ …. “Most of the candi-
dates who have a shot at winning are in favor of stem cell research. This represents a delay en route, 
but I know where we’re going, and it’s where the American people want to go.’’ (New York Times, 20 
July 2006).
 [3] See Table A1 in the Appendix for information on hESC projects in our dataset.
 [4] We exclude data points before 1992 and after 2011 so that we can compare the project initiations 
between the ten years before the announcement of the 2001 funding moratorium and the ten years in 
the post-policy era. For comparison purposes, the four time intervals are in ranges of years that are 
similar.
 [5] We manually checked the status of all the cell therapy projects we collected data on using 
Pharmaprojects and FDA decisions to trace the performance of each project in December 2014.
 [6] The Heckman correction is a two-stage method that allows the researcher to correct regression esti-
mators, which might suffer from sample selection bias. We use the heckprobit command in STATA 
because our dependent variable is dichotomous.
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Numbers of hESC projects in our data by originator country, firm size, and policy period
1997–2000 2001–2003 2004–2008 2009–2011
US projects Big firms 0 0 0 0
SMEs 1 0 8 8
Non-US projects Big firms 0 0 2 0
SMEs 0 3 2 0
total 1 3 12 8
Table A2. Example of project details extracted from the PharmaProjects database
Drug name NGN-9076 autologous neural stem cells
Drug description NGN-9076 is a stem cell therapy, under development by 
NeuroGeneration for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease 
(PD). It works by transplanting autologous human neural 
stem cells, derived from dopaminergic cells, into the affected 
striatal structures of PD patients (BIO 2007 (Boston); 





Key Event Dates and Histroy 28 Mar 2008 New Product
28 Mar 2008 Suspended Products
Development details Phase II Clinical Trial
Therapeutic Class Stem cell therapy
Antiparkinsonian
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